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Recent research has documented that the Federal Reserve produces systematic errors in 
forecasting inflation, real GDP growth, and the unemployment rate, even though these forecasts 
are unbiased.  We show that these systematic errors reveal that the Fed is “surprised” by real and 
inflationary cycles.  Using a modified Mincer-Zarnowitz regression, we show that the Fed knows 
the state of the economy for the current quarter, but cannot predict it one quarter ahead.  We 
further show that even allowing for an asymmetric loss function the Fed does not appear to know 
the state of the economy one quarter ahead. 
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Can the Fed Predict the State of the Economy? 
 
Monetary policy decisions are based on forecasts of future economic activity. 
Consequently, the Greenbook forecasts made by the Federal Reserve (Fed) staff have been 
extensively evaluated. The forecasts are quarterly predictions made several times each quarter 
with horizons of zero to eight quarters. The staff predicts GDP, its components, various price 
indices, unemployment, etc.  These forecasts should reveal what the Fed knows about the current 
and future states of the economy. 
Recent research has shown that the Fed forecasts contain systematic errors (Joutz and 
Stekler, 2000). Forecasters overestimated the rate of growth during slowdowns and recessions 
and underestimated it during recoveries and booms. Similarly, inflation was under-predicted 
when it was rising and over-predicted when it was declining.  Particularly large errors occurred 
during the 1970s and early 1980s when prices were rising rapidly.
1   
This paper explores the systematic errors in the Greenbook forecasts of real output 
growth, inflation, and the unemployment rate to determine if these errors reveal what the Fed 
knows about the state of the US economy.  If the staff has information on real and inflationary 
cycles, it should be incorporated into the forecasts.  In this analysis, we modify the Mincer-
Zarnowitz (1969) regression to include dummy variables for the NBER-dated recessions and 
ECRI-dated inflationary cycles.
2    
We first present the data and the modified Mincer-Zarnowitz regressions. Our results 
                                                 
1 Hanson and Whitehorn (2006) also observed these systematic errors but associated them with particular time 
periods rather than with stages of the business cycle. 
2 Swanson and van Dijk (2006) used a similar technique to explore the role of business cycle asymmetry for the 
rationality of early data releases.  Dynan and Elmendorf (2001) also look at early data releases focusing on real 
GNP/GDP and find that provisional estimates do not fully capture turning points.    
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show that the Fed forecasts do not incorporate information on recessions or inflationary cycles 
into the one-quarter-ahead forecasts. This information is contained in the current quarter 
forecasts, indicating that the Fed knows the state of the economy for the current quarter, but 
cannot predict it one quarter ahead. This result is robust even allowing for an asymmetric loss 
function.  
I. Data 
  We examine the Fed’s Greenbook current quarter and one quarter-ahead forecasts for the 
period 1965IV-2003IV
3 for three variables: the real output growth rate (GNP until 1991III and 
GDP from 1991IV on), the GNP/GDP deflator inflation rate, and the unemployment rate.   
Whenever there are multiple forecasts in each quarter, we use the last one.
4  The actual data are 
the NIPA estimates that are released approximately 45 days after the quarter to which they refer.
5  
All data, with the exception of the unemployment rate, are converted into annualized growth 
rates.   
  Figures (1a-1d,.., 3a-3d) present data for each variable: the annualized growth rate of real 
GNP/GDP, the annualized inflation rate as measured by the GNP/GDP deflator, and the 
unemployment rate.  The upper left hand graphs display the historical data used in the analysis.  
The other quadrants of these figures display, for each series: the current quarter and one quarter-
ahead forecast errors and the forecast revisions between the current quarter and one-quarter-
                                                 
3 The Greenbook data are only available with a 5-year lag.  We obtained our dataset from the PDF files on the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia website. 
4 We use the last forecasts for each quarter because those contain the maximum amount of information on which to 
base current and next quarter forecasts. Forecasts made within the first 10 days of the next quarter are considered 
made in the previous quarter because there would be no new information for the subsequent quarter.  We also 
analyzed forecasts made in the middle of the quarter.  The results were similar. 
5 Use of the real time data avoids definitional and classification changes and is the most consistently available data 
set for our sample.  The terminology for these data releases has varied over the sample.  We obtained similar results 
using the 90 day releases.  
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ahead forecasts.  
The shaded areas of Figures 1 and 3 represent the dates of these recessions, as defined by 
the NBER.  In Figure 2 the shaded areas represent periods when the inflation rate was increasing 
(moving from trough to peak).  The dates for the periods of the inflation cycle were obtained 
from Dr. Anirvan Banerji of the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI). 
II. The Modified Mincer-Zarnowitz  Regression and Results 
The basic Mincer-Zarnowitz  regression is:
6  
  1 , 0 ; , , 1 0 = + + = − − i e F A i t t i t t t β β    (1) 
where At and Ft,t-i are the actual and predicted values for time t.  The forecast is conditional on 
the information available at time t-i.  When i = 0, it refers to a current quarter forecast. For a test 
of informational efficiency, the null hypothesis is: 01 01 and β β = = . A rejection of this 
hypothesis indicates that the forecasts are biased and/or inefficient.  The Wald test and the F 
distribution are used to test this null. 
In order to determine whether the forecasts incorporated information about the state of 
the economy, we modified the Mincer-Zarnowitz regression: 
 1 , 0 ; , 2 , 1 0 = + + + = − − i e D F A i t t t i t t t β β β  (2) 
where Dt is a dummy that reflects the state of the economy. In the growth and unemployment 
equations, it has the value 1 if the economy was in a NBER-dated recession and is zero otherwise.  
In the inflation equation, the dummy takes on the value 1 from the trough to the peak of the 
inflation cycle as dated by ECRI, zero otherwise.  The joint null hypothesis is: 
                                                 
6 Similar results with respect to the role of the state of the economy can be obtained using the Holden and Peel (1990) 
bias test.  
  4
01 2 0, 1, 0 and β ββ == = .
7 If the dummy coefficients are non-zero, they contain information 
that can explain the forecast errors. This indicates that the Fed did not include the information on 
the state of the economy in the forecasts.  
The coefficients of the dummy variables are not significant in any of the current quarter 
equations (Table 1a), but are significant in all three one-quarter-ahead equations (Table 1b). 
These results suggest that the Fed does not know what the state of the economy will be in the 
next quarter.  On the other hand, if the Fed did have information on the state of the economy, it 
was not incorporated into these forecasts because the Wald tests associated with Equation 2 
reject the null of informational efficiency.  
In the real GDP growth equation for the one-quarter-ahead forecasts (Table 1b), the 
NBER dummy coefficient is negative, suggesting that the Fed overestimated real GDP growth 
during recessions. In addition, the constant in that equation is positive and significant, showing 
that the Fed forecasts underestimated real GDP growth during expansions.  In the inflation 
equation, the ECRI dummy coefficient is positive, indicating that the Fed underestimated 
inflation when it was increasing (moving from trough to peak in the inflation cycle).  Although 
the constant in that equation is insignificant, it is negative, i.e. the Fed overestimated inflation 
when it was decreasing.  The unemployment equation yields the expected results: the NBER 
dummy coefficient is positive, because the Fed underestimated unemployment during recessions.  
These statistical results are in accord with previous findings about systematic errors.  
III. An Asymmetric Loss Function? 
Elliott et al. (2005, 2008) argued that the traditional Mincer-Zarnowitz regression is 
                                                 
7 In applying (2) to the forecasts that have a one-quarter lead, the Newey-West procedure was used to estimate HAC 
consistent standard errors in (2).    
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actually a joint test of a symmetric loss function and informational efficiency. The Fed may not 
have a symmetric loss function, at least with respect to inflation (Capistran, 2008).  It is possible 
that our findings are due to the assumption of a symmetric loss function rather than due to the 
Fed not incorporating information about the state of the economy into their forecasts. 
We explore this possibility using the GMM method and over-identification test described 
in Elliott et al. (2008) allowing for a general Quad-Quad loss function. The results (Table 2) 
indicate that for all three variables there is evidence of an asymmetric loss function (except for 
one-quarter ahead real GDP). An asymmetry parameter of 0.5 suggests symmetric loss; if it is 
greater than 0.5 then underpredictions are costlier than overpredictions; a value less than 0.5 
suggests the reverse.  Elliott et al. (2005) showed that the J-test of overidentification is a 
consistent test of the null hypothesis that the forecasts are efficient.  Rejection of the null, as we 
find in all three cases for the Fed’s one quarter ahead forecasts, suggests that the Fed did not 
know the state of the economy or did not incorporate this information into their forecasts. 
IV. An Interpretation 
  While the dummy coefficients in the current quarter equations are not significant, they 
are significant in all of the one-quarter-ahead equations. In order to see how the current quarter 
forecasts (Ft,t) differ from the one-quarter-ahead forecasts from the previous quarter (Ft,t-1), we 
examine the revisions in the forecasts.  We compare forecasts for the same quarter (t) made at 
two different times (t and t-1).  The current quarter forecasts are the last ones that were made in 
each quarter. Consequently, at the end of the quarter there would be virtually complete 
knowledge about the state of the economy in the previous quarter and considerable information 
about the current quarter.  
  6
The state of the economy should affect the forecast revision ,  1 , , − − t t t t F F , which is then 
regressed on the state of the economy, (Dt)  
  t t t t t t D F F υ δ δ + + = − − 1 0 1 , ,  (3) 
The coefficients associated with the state of the economy are all significant and have the 
expected signs (Table 3).
8 Knowing that the economy was in a recession, the current-quarter 
GDP forecasts were revised downwards and the unemployment predictions were increased.   
When inflation was increasing, the forecast for the current quarter was revised upwards. The 
evidence indicates that when the Fed forecasters had information about the state of the economy, 
they used the information correctly because these revisions are in the right direction.  
V. Implications and Conclusions 
  Based on the forecasts made by the Fed staff, the state of the economy is known by the 
Fed only in the current quarter and is not incorporated into their one-quarter-ahead forecasts.  
These results suggest that systematic errors can exist in the forecasts (as found by Joutz and 
Stekler, 2000), but they may offset each other over the business cycle.  Because knowledge about 
the state of the economy is important for setting monetary policy, the Fed’s inability to forecast it 
one quarter ahead is disconcerting.
9  
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Table 1a: Current Quarter Greenbook Forecasts  
Modified Mincer-Zarnowitz Regressions 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 






RealGrowth  0.324* 0.993*** -0.435   
  (0.181) (0.042)  (0.341)   
0.05 
INF  -0.323** 1.006***   0.218 
  (0.155) (0.026)    (0.133) 
0.03 
UN  0.002 0.997*** 0.016   
  (0.022) (0.004)  (0.014)   
0.10 
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
 
Table 1b: One Quarter-Ahead Greenbook Forecasts 
Modified Mincer-Zarnowitz Regressions 
(Newey West Standard Errors in Parentheses) 






RealGrowth   1.916*** 0.549*** -3.744***   
   (0.585)  (0.160)  (0.578)   
<0.01 
INF   -0.446  0.988***   0.665*** 
   (0.301)  (0.065)    (0.003) 
<0.01 
UN   0.082  0.969*** 0.194**   
   (0.096)  (0.017)  (0.079)   
<0.01 
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
 




















RealGrowth   0.369***  0.436  1.567  4.992 
   (0.047)  (0.056)  (0.211)  (0.025) 
INF   0.651*** 0.680***  1.269  6.715 
   (0.058)  (0.063)  (0.260)  (0.010) 
UN   0.648** 0.684***  0.631  4.213 
   (0.074)  0.049  (0.427) 0.040 





Bias Tests for Forecast Revisions 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
    Constant   NBER Dummy  Inflation Dummy  
RealGrowth   0.123  -1.732***   
   (0.178)  (0.421)   
INF   -0.205*    0.447*** 
   (0.114)    (0.145) 
UN   -0.087***  0.169***   
   (0.026)  (0.061)   
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
 
 
 